Hawaii State
Fusion Center

Homeland Security Forum

Frank J. Pace
Administrator

31 January 2023

OHS | Agenda

- **OPENING REMARKS**
- **THREAT BRIEFS**
  - National/Federal
  - Local & Hawaii State Fusion Center initiatives
- **BREAK**
- **OHS RISK AND CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT**
  - Significant cyber incident
  - Terrorism & Targeted Violence
- **2023 WORK PLAN, PROGRAM UPDATES**
  - Cybersecurity
  - Critical Infrastructure Security & Resilience
  - Terrorism & Targeted Violence
  - Emerging threats focal point(s)
- **DISCUSSION**
- **CLOSING REMARKS**

Opening Remarks

Administrator Frank Pace

OHS | Targeted Violence Prevention Strategy



1 Outreach & Education

2 Training

3 Suspicious Activity Reporting

4 Behavioral Intervention / Threat Assessment Teams

5 Intelligence Analysis

6 Other Groups

Presented by the
State of Hawai'i Office
of Homeland Security
dod.hawaii.gov/ohs

HAWAI'I
TARGETED VIOLENCE PREVENTION STRATEGY

OHS | Homeland Security Executive Advisory Council


Homeland Security Executive Advisory Council
Secretariat: Office of Homeland Security
Subcommittees
State & Local Cybersecurity Grant Program
Homeland Security Grant Program
Critical Infrastructure Working Group
Cybersecurity Working Group
Emerging Threats Working Group
Terrorism/Targeted Violence Working Group
Information Sharing and Analysis Working Group
Elections Security
Unmanned Aerial Systems
Foreign Influence
Targeted Violence Prevention (State Team)



Hawai'i Homeland Security Executive Advisory Council

State of Hawai'i HSEAC Charter 2022

DRAFT

[illegible]

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. [illegible]

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Hawaii State Fusion Center

Threat Brief & Unit Overview

Director Kevin Baggs
Hawaii State Fusion Center

HSFC | Civil Rights and Civil Liberties



The Hawaii State Fusion Center recognizes that U.S. citizens have constitutionally protected rights to practice religion, assemble, speak, and petition. HSFC safeguards these rights under the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Hawaii, and reports on only those activities where criminal activity occurs, or the potential use of incitement rhetoric could be used to instigate criminal activity. Additionally, potential criminal activity conducted by certain member(s) of a group does not negate the constitutional rights of the group itself or its law-abiding participants to exercise their rights to practice religion, assemble, speak, or petition.

HSFC | November 2022 NTAS Bulletin

- The United States remains in a heightened threat environment. Lone offenders and small groups motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and/or personal grievances continue to pose a persistent and lethal threat to the Homeland. Domestic actors and foreign terrorist organizations continue to maintain a visible presence online in attempts to motivate supporters to conduct attacks in the Homeland. Threat actors have recently mobilized to violence, citing factors such as reactions to current events and adherence to violent extremist ideologies. In the coming months, threat actors could exploit several upcoming events to justify or commit acts of violence, including certifications related to the midterm elections, the holiday season and associated large gatherings, the marking of two years since the breach of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, and potential sociopolitical developments connected to ideological beliefs or personal hostility. Targets of potential violence include public gatherings, faith-based institutions, the LGBTQI+ community, schools, racial and religious minorities, government facilities and personnel, U.S. critical infrastructure, the media, and perceived ideological opponents.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
National Terrorism Advisory System
Bulletin
DHS.gov/advisories

HSFC | Nationwide Violent Extremism

- Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (REMVEs)
  - Transnational Trends: Training, Financial Support, and Sharing of Propaganda
- Animal Rights/Environmental Motivated Violent Extremists
- Abortion Related Violent Extremists
- Anti-Government/Anti-Authority Violent Extremists (AGAAVE)
  - Militia Violent Extremist
  - Anarchists Violent Extremists
  - Sovereign Citizen Violent Extremists

According to the Department of Homeland Security: "Among Domestic Violent Extremists, racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists—specifically white supremacist extremists9 (WSEs)—will remain the most persistent and lethal threat in the Homeland."

- **Key Judgment – The HSFC assesses that threats to critical infrastructure such as food, water, and energy supply chains pose the greatest threat to Hawaii**

  - Most remote, large population center in the world
  - Hawaii imports between 85%-90% of its food and goods
  - Severe impacts from any supply chains disruptions
  - The Honolulu Port System intakes 80% of the State’s products
  - Extremists can exploit vulnerabilities to Critical Infrastructure

HSFC | Nationwide Electrical Subsector Suspicious Activity Reports

The Department of Homeland Security has warned that power infrastructure of an “attractive” target for domestic terrorists. (npr.org, 2023)



Key

☒ Suspicious Letters ○ Sabotage ⊕ Shooting

Electrical Grid High-Profile Incidents

- North Carolina: Two men shot at an electrical substation, causing a widespread power outage. The motive remains unclear.
- Washington State: FBI stated that two individuals confessed to sabotaging the electrical substation in order to commit burglary by emptying a cash register at a local business during the outage.
- Across the nation, there have been reports of suspicious letters being sent to electrical facilities.

(U) Source: fox5dc.com

The Private Sector Engagement Department of the National Fusion Center Association will be hosting webinar of Electrical Grid Attacks, 22 February 2023.

Atlanta Public Safety Training Center

- September of 2021 agreement announced
- 85-acre police training facility
  - Immediate opposition
  - Politics issues
    - Owned by City of Atlanta but located outside the city in the county
  - Historical concerns
    - Old Atlanta Prison Farm 1918 – 1995 (possible burial site)
    - Muscogee Creek People
  - Environmental Concerns
    - South River Forest
- Defend the Atlanta Forest
  - Built shelters in the trees
  - Progressed in violence
    - Tow truck fire
    - Molotov cocktail thrown at police (8 arrests)



(U) Source: CNN.com

Atlanta Public Safety Training Center

- 8th January 2023
  - Multiagency operation commenced to clear out the area
  - Law enforcement located a man in a tent who did not comply with verbal commands
  - Subject fired shots and struck a Georgia State Trooper
  - Other law enforcement officers returned fire killing the man
  - Georgia Bureau of Investigation
    - Suspect purchased a weapon in September of 2020
  - Items seized at the camp
    - Mortar Style Fireworks
    - Multiple edge weapons
    - Pellet rifles
    - Gas masks
    - Blow torch



(U) Source: Georgia Bureau of Investigation

Atlanta Public Safety Training Center

- On January 21st clashes between protestors and police grew in size and turned violent
- Six people were arrested on charges ranging from Arson to Domestic Terrorism
- On January 26th the Governor of Georgia declared a State of Emergency.
- 1,000 Georgia National Guard troops were deployed

(U) Source: forbes.com

HSFC | Oahu First Responder Technology Campus (FRTC)

Hawaii First Responder Technology Campus

- 243-acre First Responder technology and training campus
- Intended to host City and County, State, and Federal agencies
- Undeveloped land
  - Environmental and cultural impacts



(U) Source: ssfm.com

HSFC | Oahu First Responder Technology Campus (FRTC)

Pali Highway Traffic Sign Manipulated

- On 25 January 2023, a road sign on the Pali Highway was manipulated to state, ***"De-occupy Hawaii… Stop Cop City… Defend Atlanta Forest."***



(U) Source: hawaiinewsnow.com

HSFC | Nationwide Mass Shooting Statistics

Mass Attacks: three or more victims, not including the suspect



(U) Source: United States Secret Service



(U) Source: United States Secret Service



Monterey Park, CA

21 January 2023



- Suspect = 72 y.o. male
- Fired 42 rounds from .9mm modified pistol
- Killed 11, injured 9 at Star Dance Studio
  .308 mm rifle + hundreds of rounds found in home
- Grievance: Unknown. Suspect complained to police in early Jan about fraud, theft, and poisoning 10-20 years ago. Speculation about DV or other personal motive.

Sourcing:
https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/25/us/california-three-mass-shootings-19-killed/index.html
https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/motive-monterey-park-mass-shooting-suspect/3079173/

HSFC | Recent High Profile Mass Shooting



Half Moon Bay, CA

23 January 2023

- Suspect = 66 year old male farmworker
- Killed 7, injured 1
- Semi-automatic handgun
- 2 farms
- Grievance: Workplace killing due to perceived bullying

Analyst Note: There had been an unrelated prior shooting at one of the locations.

Source: https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2023-01-26/half-moon-bay-farmworkers-working-conditions-investigation

HSFC | Cybersecurity Threats-Recommended Mitigations

- Regularly back up data; air gap, password protect backup copies offline; ensure copies of critical data are not accessible for modification or deletion where data resides.
- Implement network segmentation.
- Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, secure location.
- Install updates/patch operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as released.
- Use multifactor authentication with strong pass phrases where possible.
- Use strong passwords, regularly change passwords to network systems and accounts, implementing shortest acceptable timeframe for password changes. Avoid reusing passwords for multiple accounts.
- Disable unused remote access/RDP ports and monitor remote access/RDP logs.
- Require administrator credentials to install software.
- Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls with least privilege in mind.
- Install and regularly update anti-virus and anti-malware software on all hosts.
- Only use secure networks, avoid using public Wi-Fi networks; consider using VPN.
- Consider adding an email banner to messages coming from outside your organizations.
- Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
- Focus on cyber security awareness and training. Regularly provide users with training on information security principles and techniques as well as overall emerging cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities.



TLP:WHITE

Private Industry Notification

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CYBER DIVISION

1 September 2021

PIN Number
20210901-001

Please contact the FBI with any questions related to this Private Industry Notification at either your local **Cyber Task Force** or **FBI CyWatch**.

Local Field Offices:
www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices

E-mail:
cywatch@fbi.gov

Phone:
1-855-292-3937

The following information is being provided by the FBI, with no guarantees or warranties, for potential use at the sole discretion of recipients to protect against cyber threats. This data is provided to help cyber security professionals and system administrators guard against the persistent malicious actions of cyber actors. This PIN was coordinated with DHS-CISA.

This PIN has been released TLP:WHITE: Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction.

Cyber Criminal Actors Targeting the Food and Agriculture Sector with Ransomware Attacks

Summary

Ransomware attacks targeting the Food and Agriculture sector disrupt operations, cause financial loss, and negatively impact the food supply chain. Ransomware may impact businesses across the sector, from small farms to large producers, processors and manufacturers, and markets and restaurants. Cyber criminal threat actors exploit network vulnerabilities to exfiltrate data and encrypt systems in a sector that is increasingly reliant on smart technologies, industrial control systems, and internet-based automation systems.

Food and agriculture businesses victimized by ransomware suffer significant financial loss resulting from ransom payments, loss of productivity, and remediation costs. Companies may also experience the loss of proprietary information and personally identifiable information (PII) and may suffer reputational damage resulting from a ransomware attack.

TLP:WHITE

Source:
https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/210907.pdf

HSFC | National Fusion Center Network



🔴 Primary Fusion Center

⚫ Recognized Fusion Center

🟤 New York City Intelligence Officer

HSFC | Organization and Functions

Hawaii State Fusion Center:

- Three full-time Intelligence Analysts and one TVTP Program Manager

Formalized Liaison Partners:

- DHS (HSI, TSA, CISA, Coast Guard, USSS), and FBI
- Over 200 industry partners
- Largest Distribution List: 700+ for cybersecurity

Hawaii State Fusion Center Analytical Capabilities:

- HSIN Coordinator for the State
- Social-Media
- Open-Source
- Long-term Case Support
- Special Event Threat Assessment
- Real-time major event support
- Visiting Dignitary Threat Assessment
- Major Incident Notification
- Suspicious Activity Reporting Intelligence

HSFC | Website Overview



Hawaii State Fusion Center

Dedicated to Information Sharing and Analysis
To Better Protect Our Communities

About the Hawaii State Fusion Center

The Hawaii State Fusion Center (HSFC) is a Hawaii State government program that facilitates intelligence sharing between local, state, and federal agencies, and the public and private sectors.

As the nation's 77th Fusion Center, it is uniquely structured to empower front-line law enforcement, public safety, fire service, emergency response, public health, critical infrastructure partners, and private sector security personnel to understand local implications of national intelligence, thus enabling local officials to better protect their communities.

What We Do

The HSFC collects tips, leads, and other threat information through suspicious activity reporting (SAR). It conducts analysis, disseminates intelligence, and provides training and technology resources. The top priorities are counter terrorism and cyber security.

Join Us

The HSFC serves multiple sectors in a "whole of community" approach.

SUBMIT TIP/LEAD

Report criminal activity and potential threats

Link: https://hsfc.hawaii.gov

HSFC | Suspicious Activity Reporting



Hawaii State Fusion Center

Dedicated to Information Sharing and Analysis
To Better Protect Our Communities

SUBMIT A TIP / LEAD

Report Crimes, Threats, Suspicious Activity to the Hawaii State Fusion Center

If this submission requires immediate emergency response you must call 911.

Incident Date: *
mm/dd/yyyy

Approximate Time:
--:-- --

Type of Activity:*

- □ Assault
- □ Burglary
- □ Cyber Threat
- □ Drug Activity
- □ Election Related
- □ Gang Activity
- □ Human Trafficking
- □ Robbery
- □ Suspicious Person / Vehicle
- □ Terrorism
- □ Theft
- □ Other (specify below)

Describe the criminal or suspicious conduct, what you saw and persons involved - be specific*

Who - What - When - Where - Why Suspicious?)

Name of Business / Location (If applicable):

Incident Location - Street Address or Cross Streets (only):*

City:*

County / Island: *
- Select County/Island-

Attach any photos / videos / files:
Choose File No file chosen
Choose File No file chosen
Choose File No file chosen
Choose File No file chosen

If you would be willing to be contacted confidentially by an investigator,
please complete the contact information below. Follow-up questions are always helpful.

Submitter's Name:

Best Contact Number:

Email Address:

□ I wish to remain anonymous

All tips are anonymous unless the submitter provides their contact information.
Your IP Address is not being logged and/or transmitted with this submission.

Submit a Tip/Lead

HSFC | 2022 Year End Review

- Terrorist Screening Center Encounters: 19
- HSIN Exchange Requests: 84
- Total Requests For Information: 260
- Agencies:
  - Federal: 48
  - Fusion Centers: 16
  - DPS Sheriff: 1
  - Honolulu PD: 19
  - Neighbor Island: 1
- Suspicious Activity Reporting: 29
- Products Written by HSFC: 135 *approximate
  - Product Types: Special Event Threat Assessment, School Safety Bulletin, Cyber Security Awareness Bulletins, Situational Awareness Bulletin, Officer Safety Bulletins, and Intelligence Bulletins

- Targeted Violence Terrorism Prevention Presentations and Events: 35 with approximately 1000 participants
- School Threats: 17 *approximate number
- HSFC Website Usage 4th Quarter 2022:
  - HSFC: 2800 average of 15 hits a day
  - HHVISA: 12,487 average of 67 hits a day
  - SafeKeiki: 2468 average of 18 hits a day



REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION



CRIME TYPES BY REQUEST



HSFC | Memphis Police Use-of-Force Incident

Memphis Police Department

- An individual was pulled over and arrested on 7 January 2023 involving several police officers
- The individual later died in police custody
- Since the incident occurred, there have been major concerns for criminal activity associated to the calls for reform.
- National Fusion Center Association sends out request for information regarding potential threats in relation to the incident that occurred in Memphis, TN to stand-up a nationwide dashboard.

Disclaimer:
Fusion centers can play a valuable role in supporting law enforcement's involvement in First Amendment-protected events. As part of the Pre-Event Stage, fusion centers can support state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies as they undergo a Pre-Event Assessment. This support may include the completion of an applicable assessment and the utilization of publicly available material (such as social media tools and resources) that pertains to potential threats to the event and/or organizations participating in the event, including potential counterdemonstration groups. If the Pre-Event Assessment does not identify any risk or threat, then the fusion center should not distribute the assessment beyond those customers who are serving a public safety role for the event. Fusion centers may also support the Operational Stage by assisting in information-/intelligence-related inquiries officers may have in response to an event.

If a criminal predicate or reasonable suspicion is identified or the findings of the Pre-Event Assessment provide specific, actionable intelligence, fusion centers may support agency leadership and law enforcement officers by identifying the collection requirements4 applicable to the event, based on the mission and role of the fusion center. In those limited circumstances, fusion centers should also be involved in any post-event activities, including the information evaluation, dissemination, and retention efforts. Fusion centers should not be involved in post-event evaluation, dissemination, and retention efforts of events that involve only routine public safety issues, such as conflicts between demonstrators or crowd-control problems.

HSFC | Success Stories

Counterfeit Gold Scam

- HSFC received information about a previously deported felon suspected of being engaged in a counterfeit gold scam in Hawaii. HSFC conducted research and learned the suspect had moved on from Hawaii and was now operating his scam in Denver, CO. Information was shared with Colorado authorities.



4 arrested, released on Kauai amid concerning spread of fake jewelry scam

Four of the suspects arrested on Kauai with alleged ties to a growing jewelry scam. (Kauai Police)

Glock Switch Investigation:

- HSFC received an intelligence report from the mainland about a load of Glock Switches that was shipped from China and confiscated by LE on the East Coast. HSFC conducted social media analysis for local implications and discovered a person selling Glock Switches over the internet from a location in Hawaii. HSFC reported the incident to the Honolulu ATF Field Office and a subsequent news article reported that a case was generated, and a person was arrested locally. Link to article:



Federal agents in Hawaii see rise in device that turns pistols into mini machine guns

The size of a quarter, it is illegal to possess — whether or not it is attached to a gun.

HSFC | Questions

Questions?

Kevin Baggs, Director
Email: Kevin.l.baggs@hawaii.gov
Phone: (808) 354-9346

Hawaii State Fusion Center: HSFC@hawaii.gov
Register for our website!

Submit Tips / Leads at https://hsfc.hawaii.gov

Risk and Capability Assessment

Planning & Operations Branch Chief
Jimmie Collins

OHS | Prior Assessment Capabilities Focus

- ***Cybersecurity*** – Increase the State of Hawaii’s ability to prevent, protect, respond to, and mitigate the effects of a significant cyber incident impacting critical infrastructure.

- ***Physical Protective Measures*** — Increase the State of Hawaii’s ability to prevent and protect critical infrastructure from significant threats and hazards and mitigate vulnerabilities impacting critical infrastructure.

- ***Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities*** — Increase the State of Hawaii’s ability to prevent and protect critical infrastructure from significant physical or cyber threats and hazards and mitigate vulnerabilities impacting critical infrastructure.

OHS | 2022 Progress

Planning

- Established inaugural Hawaiʻi Homeland Security Strategy
- Established inaugural Hawaiʻi Targeted Violence Prevention Strategy
- Established executive branch Cyber Incident Response Plan and statewide Cyber Disruption (significant cyber incident) Response Plan
- Drafted Hawaiʻi Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Program Strategy, Planning Framework, and Implementation Guide (currently in review)
- Established scope of work for consultancy support in developing statewide Cybersecurity Program (strategy, implementation plan, response plans, workforce development strategy/implementation plan)

Organization

- Drafted Homeland Security Executive Advisory Council charter, executive order, and membership roster (currently in review)
- Established State & Local Cybersecurity Grant Program Subcommittee
- Established scope of work for consultancy support in institute statewide 'common operating picture' on critical functions/infrastructure

Exercise

- Held statewide Cyber Disruption Response Plan exercise
- Held two Elections security tabletop exercises
- Assisted in planning and participated in TSA/USCG Cyber Challenge

OHS | 2023 Threat/Assessments – Significant Cyber Incident (#1 priority)

Type: Cyber Attack; Category: Human Caused

- ***Cybersecurity***— Guidelines, Regulations, and Standards; Sharing Threat Information



Planning	Need State Cybersecurity Strategy & Implementation Plan(s) and county/entity-level cyber incident response protocols/plans.	1
Organization	Need State Cybersecurity Workforce Development Strategy & Implementation Plan(s)	3
Equipment	Need comprehensive assessment of relevant entity's regarding capabilities/capacities/protocols	2
Training	Need State Cybersecurity Workforce Development Strategy & Implementation Plan(s)	5
Exercise	Lacking dedicated cyber security exercise program/cycle of annual exercises.	4

OHS | 2023 Threats/Assessments – Domestic Terrorism (#2 priority)

Type: Other (Improvised Explosive Devices/Vehicle Ramming); Category: Human Caused

•***Public Information and Warning*** – Delivering Actionable Guidance; Alerts and Warnings; Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Messaging; Inclusiveness of the Entire Public

Planning	Developing a foreign language messaging campaign targeting the participant population.	1
Organization	Improved collaboration between OHS and HPD but remains limited. Limited collaboration between HI-EMA PIO and Office of Homeland Security (OHS).	2
Equipment	identify multiple communications platforms to message participant demographics addressing multi-lingual needs.	3
Training		
Exercise	Limited training exercises addressing the capability gap	4

•***Intelligence and Information Sharing*** – Analysis of Intelligence and Information; Developing Reports and Products; Disseminating Intelligence and Information; Exploiting and Processing Information; Feedback and Evaluation; Gathering Intelligence

Planning	Update/merge planning documents	4
Organization	LE/Fusion center integration improved but the lack of a formal FLO program remains.	1
Equipment	Additional tech platforms were added to the Fusion Center and analyst abilities were enhanced.	5
Training	Creation of the FLO program and meeting the programs training needs will close this capability gap.	2
Exercise	Exercise the intelligence collection, gathering and dissemination during exercises	3

•***Interdiction and Disruption*** – Interdicting Cargo, Conveyances, and Persons

Planning	Collaborative development of protocols and established communication channels.	1
Organization	Identify additional partnerships for coordination and collaboration	3
Equipment	Identify a mass media messaging platform	2
Training	Additional training always necessary for the review/update of planning	5
Exercise	Exercise plans to validate to effectiveness and validity of the plan	4

•***Screening, Search, Detection*** – Screening; Wide-Area Search

Planning	Identification of screening procedures	1
Organization		
Equipment	Procurement of screening equipment and relevant training.	2
Training	Incorporate screening techniques into training	3
Exercise	Incorporate screening techniques into exercises	4

OHS | 2023 Threats/Assessments – Domestic Terrorism (#2 priority) continued

Type: Other (Improvised Explosive Devices/Vehicle Ramming); Category: Human Caused

- ***Access Control & Identity Verification*** – Delivering Actionable Guidance; Alerts and Warnings; Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Messaging; Inclusiveness of the Entire Public

Planning	Develop access control protocols	1
Organization		
Equipment		
Training	Need to ensure access control verification is included in training	2
Exercise	Include access control verification is part of exercises.	3

- ***Physical Protective Measures*** – Physical Security Measures; Site-Specific and Process-Specific Risk Assessments

Planning	Lacking data for critical infrastructure entities, systems, critical components, and interdependencies/dependencies	2
Organization	Lack personnel/capacity to complete data gathering and management	1
Equipment	Federal CISA Gateway is perceived to be inadequate for state needs/desires; lack state-level system/process with appropriate data security protections	3
Training	No training has been identified to develop infrastructure assessment skills base at the state level	4
Exercise	There are no exercises dedicated to demonstrating the impact of threats to singular or multiple criticial infrastructure entities	5

- ***Fatality Management Services*** – Analysis of Intelligence and Information; Developing Reports and Products; Disseminating Intelligence and Information; Exploiting and Processing Information; Feedback and Evaluation; Gathering Intelligence

Planning	There is no state or county plan defining required mass casualty capabilities for a terrorism/targeted violence incident.	1
Organization	Medical examiners office is severely constrained in personnel required to handle incidents of this magnitude and is the only such resource for the entire state.	5
Equipment	Medical examiners office is severely constrained in equipment required to handle incidents of this magnitude and is the only such resource for the entire state.	4
Training	There is no consolidated picture of training completed, needed.	3
Exercise	There have been no Terrorism/Target Violence exercises.	2

- ***On-Scene Security & Protection*** – Law Enforcement; Protecting Response Personnel; Securing Disaster Areas

Planning	Lack of integration among state and county resources to provide consistent coordination, collaboration, and documentation.	1
Organization	identify funding gaps in revenue streams to ensure funding for incident related costs. i.e. overtime	4
Equipment	leverage latest technologies/equiptment available to first responders.	5
Training	Limited joint training among state and county resources.	2
Exercise	Limited joint exercise opportunities.	3

2023 Work Plan, Program Updates

OHS | OHS-External Sources and Requirements

Hawaii State Fusion Center

- Strengthen State of Hawaiʻi homeland security governance.
- Codify the processes, partnerships, and systems for information and intelligence analysis and dissemination.
- Grow a professional cadre of homeland security experts.
- Develop functional core programs to cultivate a state of readiness for homeland security threats.
- Mobilize, motivate, and educate a network of homeland security champions.
- Solidify statewide homeland security resilience through planning, resource acquisition, training, and exercises.
- Advance homeland security capabilities utilizing a continuous improvement cycle.
- Promote proactive vigilance toward homeland security threats that have the potential to impact Hawaiʻi.



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HAWAIʻI HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY

2022-2025

- Implement cyber governance and planning.
- Assess and evaluate systems and capabilities.
- Mitigate prioritized issues.
- Build a cybersecurity workforce.



The Department of Homeland Security Notice of Funding Opportunity Fiscal Year 2022 State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program

Release Date: Sep 16, 2022

Download a PDF copy of this webpage.

Effective April 4, 2022, the Federal Government transitioned from using the Data Universal Numbering System or DUNS number, to a new, non-proprietary identifier known as a Unique Entity Identifier or UEI. For entities that have an active registration in the System for Award Management (SAM) prior to this date, the UEI has automatically been assigned and no action is necessary. For all entities filing a new registration in SAM.gov on or after April 4, 2022, the UEI will be assigned to that entity as part of the SAM.gov registration process.

UEI registration information is available on GSA.gov at Unique Entity Identifier Update | GSA.

Visit Grants.gov for registration information. Detailed information regarding UEI and SAM is also provided in Section D of this funding notice.

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A. Program Description

1. Issued By
2. Assistance Listings Number
3. Assistance Listings Title



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HAWAIʻI
TARGETED VIOLENCE PREVENTION STRATEGY

2022

- Draft a comprehensive state-wide Targeted Violence Prevention strategy
- Build a multi-domain, coordinated network to implement the strategy
- Secure a conducive environment for strategy implementation
- Build capacity among key stakeholders and agencies
- Reduce and mitigate community and individual risk factors
- Educate community on what Targeted Violence is and prevention approaches
- Ensure Behavior Intervention/Threat Assessment Management Teams operate effectively throughout the state
- Foster community resilience in the aftermath of a targeted violence event and prevent cycles of violence
- Facilitate rehabilitation of individuals who previously engaged in targeted violence and/or who became at-risk for targeted violence while in correctional facilities
- Sustain conducive environment
- Support professional development, learning, and improvement

OHS | OHS-Preparedness Priorities – Significant Cyber Incident

PLANNING	Develop State Cybersecurity Strategy & Implementation Plan(s) and county/entity-level cyber incident response protocols/plans.
ORGANIZATION	Consider additional state legislated authorities to delineate cyber incident response requirements that parallel consequence management activities under Stafford Act authorities.
EQUIPMENT	Ensure development of State Cybersecurity Strategy & Implementation Plan(s) include baseline equipment standards; establish minimum assessment thresholds for configuration, security, and the like in line with SLCGP requirements.
TRAINING	Develop State Cybersecurity Workforce Development Strategy & Implementation Plan(s) to include training standards in line with SLCGP requirements.
EXERCISE	Conduct incident response exercises in each county (utilizing established protocols/plans from Planning; establish state-led multi-year cyber exercise series.

OHS | OHS-Preparedness Priorities – Domestic Terrorism

PLANNING	•Synchronize efforts of the Fusion Center with the OHS Planning & Operations Branch's priority planning and programmatic efforts. •Incorporate screening into incident response planning. •Identify partners for appropriate access control process development. •Complete Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Program Strategy, Planning Framework, and Implementation Guide; establish consultancy contract to collect, collate, and organize necessary data. •Develop a Mass Casualty Attachment to the terrorism/targeted violence response annex during plan review. •Develop joint planning process among state and county law enforcement jurisdictions. •Explore establishing public awareness campaign; fully implement Suspicious Activity Reporting.
ORGANIZATION	•Integrate PIO with OHS outreach initiatives. •Developing Fusion Liaison Officer positions. •Establish consultancy contract to collect, collate, and organize critical infrastructure data. •Review unified coordination structure; identify potential for mutual aid/private sector partnerships.
EQUIPMENT	•Complete implementation of emergency messaging platform. •Establish competency in newly procured platforms. •Procure mass media messaging platform •Identify potential equipment solution for screening. •Establish consultancy contract to implement critical infrastructure data collection, collation, and organization. •Identify potential for mutual fatality management aid/private sector partnerships. •Identify potential on-scene security/protection equipment gaps.
TRAINING	•Conduct PIO/spokesperson and media training. •Conduct ‘credible threat’ multi-agency training. •Identify screening and wide-area search training and standards. •Conduct access control training. •Explore training sources to build skills base for organically sourced state level infrastructure assessments. •Identify fatality management services training opportunities. •Identify on-scene security/protection training.
EXERCISE	•Build PIO scenario into every exercise. •Build exercise objectives for law enforcement interdiction. •Incorporate screening into exercise programs. •Integrate the access control protocols into exercise scenarios. •Identify exercise opportunities to include dedicated critical infrastructure scenarios impacting multiple critical infrastructure entities. •Develop City & County-based crawl/walk/run exercise development/fielding schedule cycle utilizing Hawaii Homeland Security TTX Toolkit. •Integrate tabletops, drills, and workshops leading to full scale exercising of on-scene security/protection.

OHS | OHS-Preparedness Priorities – Homeland Security Strategy Implementation Plan

TASK	ASSIGNED TO	PROGRESS	START	END
Counterterrorism Program		33%	1/1/21	4/28/23
Establish Terrorism Prevention Strategy.	Jimmie	0%	10/3/22	1/31/23
Publish Strategy on OHS/P&O page.	Jimmie	0%	2/1/23	2/28/23
Establish Terrorism Prevention Strategy Implementation Plan.	Jimmie	0%	1/2/23	3/31/23
Publish Implementation Plan on OHS/P&O page.	Jimmie	0%	4/3/23	4/28/23

TASK	ASSIGNED TO	PROGRESS	START	END
Targeted Violence Prevention Program		57%	6/13/22	4/28/23
Establish Targeted Violence Prevention Strategy Implementation Plan	Jimmie	10%	1/3/23	3/31/23
Publish Implementation Plan on OHS page.	Jimmie	0%	4/3/23	4/28/23

TASK	ASSIGNED TO	PROGRESS	START	END
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Program		45%	10/3/22	12/30/22
Establish Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Strategy.	Jimmie	90%	10/3/22	12/30/22
Publish Strategy on OHS/P&O page.	Jimmie	0%	12/12/22	12/30/22
Establish Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Strategy Implementation Plan.	Jimmie	90%	10/3/22	12/30/22
Publish Implementation Plan on OHS/P&O page.	Jimmie	0%	12/12/22	12/30/22
Draft SOW for Common Operating Picture data management system	Jimmie	75%	11/21/22	12/30/22

OHS | OHS-Preparedness Priorities – Homeland Security Strategy Implementation Plan

Hawaii State
Fusion Center

TASK	ASSIGNED TO	PROGRESS	START	END
Cyber Security Program		29%	4/1/20	8/31/24
2022-25 SLCGP State matching funds committed	Frank	0%	11/15/22	11/30/22
2022 SLCGP County consent on pass-through	Glen	0%	11/15/22	11/30/22
Contract Consultant	Glen	0%	1/3/23	2/17/23
Cyber Disruption Consequence Management Workshop – kickoff meeting	Jimmie	0%	1/24/23	1/24/23
Establish Cybersecurity Strategy.	Jimmie	0%	2/20/23	5/19/23
Establish Cybersecurity Strategy Implementation Plan.	Jimmie	0%	2/20/23	5/19/23
Cyber Disruption Consequence Management Workshop (t) wk of	Jimmie	0%	3/28/23	3/31/23
Draft SOW for Obj 2 (County/Entity Assessment/Evaluation)	Jimmie	0%	4/3/23	4/28/23
Subcommittee reviews Strategy & Implementation Plan(s)	Jimmie	0%	5/15/23	5/19/23
DHS approval of Strategy & Implementation Plan(s)	Jimmie	0%	5/22/23	5/31/23
Publish Strategy on OHS/P&O page.	Jimmie	0%	5/22/23	5/31/23
Publish Implementation Plan on OHS/P&O page.	Jimmie	0%	5/22/23	5/31/23
Contract Consultant - Entity-Level Cybersecurity Assessment & Evaluation	Glen	0%	6/1/23	6/30/23
2023 SLCGP application submission	Glen	0%	6/1/23	6/30/23
CIRP Exercise Development (CISA) - cross ref @ Event Calendar.xls	Jimmie	0%	6/1/23	8/31/23
Draft SOW for Obj 3 (Mitigation) **Notional task until Obj 1 & 2 met	Jimmie	0%	7/3/23	7/31/23
Conduct Statewide Entity-Level Cybersecurity Assessment & Evaluation	Jimmie	0%	7/3/23	8/31/23
Develop CIRPs	Jimmie	0%	7/3/23	8/31/23
Contract Consultant / Mitigation investments	Glen	0%	8/1/23	8/31/23
Subcommittee CIRP review/approval	Jimmie	0%	8/28/23	8/31/23
2023 SLCGP investment distributions	Glen	0%	9/1/23	9/30/23
Field CIRP Exercises	Jimmie	0%	9/1/23	9/30/23
Develop Statewide Cyber Workforce Development Strategy and Implementation Plan(s)	Jimmie	0%	9/1/23	12/29/23
Conduct Mitigation activities	Jimmie	0%	9/1/23	8/31/24

OHS | OHS-Proposed 2023 Training Program Activities

Primary Core Capability	Course Title	Course ID
TERRORISM & TARGETED VIOLENCE		
Access Control and Identity Verification		
	Law Enforcement Prevention and Deterrence of Terrorist Acts	AWR-122-C
	Document Inspection for Law Enforcement	PER-383
Fatality Management Services		
	Mass Fatalities Incident Response Course	G0386
On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement		
	Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Construction and Classification	AWR-333
	Introduction to the Terrorist Attack Cycle	AWR-334
	Response to Suspicious Behaviors and Items for Bombing Prevention	AWR-335
	Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Explosive Effects Mitigation	AWR-337
	Homemade Explosive (HME) and Precursor Awareness	AWR-338
	Law Enforcement Active Shooter Emergency Response (LASER)	PER-275
	Active Threat Integrated Response Course (ATIRC)	PER-340
Physical Protective Measures		
	Event Security Planning for Public Safety Professionals	MGT-335-W
Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities		
	Sport and Special Event Enhanced Risk Management and Assessment	MGT-466
	Crowd Management for Sport and Special Events	MGT-475
Screening, Search, and Detection		
	Site Protection through Observational Techniques	AWR-219-C

OHS | OHS-Proposed 2023 Training Program Activities

Primary Core Capability Course Title	Course ID
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE	
Community Resilience	
Critical Infrastructure Resilience and Community Lifelines	MGT-414
Infrastructure Systems	
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Awareness	MGT-414
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, An Introduction	AWR-213
Disaster Management for Public Services	IS0860.C
Intelligence and Information Sharing	
The Homeland Security Geospatial Concept-of-Operations (GeoCONOPS) for Planners and Decision Makers	IS0060.B
Operational Coordination	
Geospatial Information Infrastructure (GII)	IS0063.B
DHS Common Operating Picture Application	IS0064.A
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience: Achieving Results through Partnership and Collaboration	IS0913.a
Physical Protective Measures	
Critical Infrastructure Security: Theft and Diversion - What You Can Do	IS0916
Planning	
ArcGIS for Emergency Managers	E0190
Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment	
Critical Asset Risk Management	MGT-315
Screening, Search, and Detection	
Protecting Critical Infrastructure Against Insider Threats	IS0915

OHS | OHS-Proposed 2023 Training Program Activities

Primary Core Capability	Course Title	Course ID
MANAGEMENT		
Community Resilience		
	National Preparedness Goal and System Overview	IS2000
	Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment and Stakeholder Preparedness Review	MGT-310
	Readiness: Training Identification and Preparedness Planning	MGT-418
Operational Communications		
	Effective Communication	IS0242.c
Operational Coordination		
	Situational Awareness	G0142
	National Prevention Framework, An Introduction	IS2500
	National Protection Framework, An Introduction	IS2600
	National Mitigation Framework, An Introduction	IS2700
Planning		
	Planning Process Theory and Application	E0237
	Continuity Planning	E1301
	Continuity of Operations Program Management	E1302
	Introduction to Continuity of Operations	IS1300
Public Information and Warning		
	Working with the Media	AWR-209-W
	Basic Public Information Officers Course	G0290
	Public Information in an All-Hazards Incident	MGT-318
	Social Media Engagement Strategies	PER-343
Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities		
	Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations	IS0156
	Exercise Evaluation and Improvement Planning	E0131
Threats and Hazard Identification		
	Natural Disaster Awareness for Security Professionals	AWR-322-W
	Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment and Stakeholder Preparedness Review	AWR-401-W

OHS | OHS-Proposed 2023 Exercise Program Activities

Title/Focus	Execution	
Behavioral Health Response to Mass Violence Incidents	2/13/23	2/14/23
Cyber Disruption Consequence Management Workshop (FEMA)	3/29/23	3/29/23
(t) HI Cyber 2023: counties w/utilities, non-ETS entities (SLCGP subcmte leads?)	Apr-Jun (notional)	
(t) FEMA False Information Workshops	5/1/23	5/31/23
(t) Cyber Dawn Exercise @ CA	6/1/23	6/30/23
Clear Path XI Continuity Comms Drill	7/25/23	7/26/23
Clear Path XI Social Media Drill	8/1/23	8/1/23
Clear Path XI	8/14/23	8/17/23
GridEx VII	11/14/23	11/15/23
(t) T&TV Annex TTX 2023	2023	
(t) HI Cyber 2024: Transportation, Communications, Elections sectors	2024	
(t) DHS Cyber Storm 2024	2024	
(t) T&TV Annex CPX 2024	2024	
(t) HI Cyber 2025: Wider Pacific (Guam, Am Samoa, others?)	2025	
(t) T&TV Annex FSE 2025	2025	

Hawaii State
Fusion Center

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Discussion

Questions/Comments?

Closing Remarks

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